Guided by evidence from eye-tracking studies of choice, pairwise comparison is assumed to be the building block of the decision-making procedure. A decision-maker with a rational preference may nevertheless consider the constituent pairwise comparisons gradually, easier comparisons preceding difficult ones. Facing a choice problem she may be unable to complete all relevant comparisons and choose with equal odds from alternatives not found inferior.
Introduction
The literature on eye-tracking analysis of multialternative choice, pioneered by Russo and Rosen (1975) , offers evidence of the actual choice procedure consisting primarily of a sequence of pairwise comparisons. 1 For a rational agent capable of considering all relevant comparisons (those that shrink the set of options being considered) before making a choice, the simultaneity or sequentiality of such comparisons is irrelevant. This is untrue if the agent is often, for unobservable reasons, unable to complete all relevant comparisons.
I study such a boundedly rational agent who considers the relevant pairwise comparisons of her underlying strict rational preference sequentially to remove inferior alternatives from a given choice set. This sequence is menu-independent in the particular sense that if two different pairwise comparisons are both relevant in two distinct choice problems then they are considered in the same order in both. The set of relevant pairwise comparisons, however, is menu dependent. Facing a choice problem the agent may be forced to stop at different points along this sequence of relevant comparisons according to some unobserved and menu-dependent probability distribution.
While she is able to make all relevant comparisons with positive probability, it is not certain. Upon stopping she chooses from alternatives that have not been removed from the choice set with equal odds. Choice resulting from this procedure is called a Gradual Pairwise Comparison Rule (GPCR).
The random nature of stopping along the sequence makes the choice behaviour stochastic. Such boundedly rational behaviour is consistent with a rich set of (stochastic) choice data, including deterministic rational choice, Luce rules (Luce (1959) ) and
Additive Perturbed Utility rules (Fudenberg et al. (2015) ), but also choice data where the order of choice probabilities across alternatives is menu-dependent.
The assumption of menu-independence of the order of relevant comparisons follows from a more basic assumption that the order reflects the agent's relative ease of making such comparisons, with easier comparisons preceding difficult ones. This relative ease may be subjective and known to the agent alone. Nevertheless, it ensures that the order of comparison is menu-independent (see Section 5.2) . This order can be inferred from choice data (Theorem 5).
The random stopping could arise from different sources such as fatigue (from making multiple comparisons) or unobserved time constraints. Section 4 describes how GPCRs can exhibit violations of strong (and moderate) stochastic transitivity, the similarity effect and regularity violations, thereby suggesting one avenue through which fatigue or time constraints could yield such non-standard behaviour.
The primary objective of this study is to carefully analyze a simple decision procedure built upon the empirical finding that choice involves a sequence of pairwise comparisons and the idea that easier comparisons precede difficult ones. 2, 3 The exercise is made more compelling by the ability of this procedure to explain disparate behavioural phenomena despite an underlying stable rational preference. The latter facilitates standard welfare analysis.
The ordinal content of choice probabilities in a GPCR is essentially determined by the sequence of pairwise comparisons (Theorem 1). Changing the choice probabilities of a GPCR without changing the ordinal content, leads to a new GPCR where only the random stopping specification needs changing (Theorem 2). As a result, checking whether some choice data is a GPCR amounts to verifying if there exists a sequence of pairwise comparisons that can generate the required choice ranks.
The model is characterized by three simple axioms (Theorem 3) and each GPCR is shown to correspond to a unique underlying strict preference (Theorem 4). The latter is easily identified with the agent strictly preferring a to b if and only if a has the highest choice probability in some set containing b.
Multiple sequences of pairwise comparisons can be consistent with the same GPCR.
It may be, though, that in all such representations, certain pairwise comparisons must be considered before some others. These are fully identified by using a revealed preference approach (Theorem 5).
This study owes a considerable debt to Apesteguia and Ballester (2013) and Manzini and Mariotti (2012) . Not only did they introduce the framework of choice resulting from a sequence of pairwise comparisons on which the current model is built, they also made the valuable finding that identifying from choice data the first relevant pairwise comparison for any (collection of) choice set(s), is key to characterizing their sequential procedures. This idea is essential in the current setting too and is captured by one of the three axioms that characterize the model. The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the GPC choice procedure and discusses an example. Section 3 contains all the characterization results. The proof of theorem 1 is retained in the main body of the text to give the reader a better sense of how the model works. All other proofs are collected in the appendix, along with the discussion on the independence of axioms. Section 4 discusses the specific ways in which GPCRs can accommodate violations of stochastic transitivity and other forms of menu-dependent choice. Section 5 discusses the key components of the GPC procedure and how they relate to other models of boundedly rational choice and stochastic choice.
Stochastic Choice and Procedures

Preliminaries
Consider a nonempty finite set of alternatives X and let X be the set of all non-empty subsets of X. These are the choice sets the decision-maker faces. The decision-maker is assumed to have a strict rational preference. This is captured by a binary relation, P ⊆ X × X, where (a, b) ∈ P means that a is strictly preferred to b. 4 It will often be convenient to represent this binary relation by where a b ≡ (a, b) ∈ P . Denote the set of all strict rational preferences over X as P.
Definition 1.
A stochastic choice rule is a function p : X × X → [0, 1] such that a∈A p(a, A) = 1 for all A ∈ X and p(a, A) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Here p(a, A) is the probability with which a is chosen when the decision-maker faces the choice set A. Stochastic choice rules are clearly more general than deterministic ones, which in addition require p(a, A) ∈ {0, 1}. More importantly, they better accommodate observed choice data in that they can represent the relative observed choice frequencies obtained from repeated choices by the decision maker. Let a stochastic choice rule without ties be a stochastic choice rule p such that p(a, A) = p(b, A) for all a, b ∈ A ∈ X , with a = b. These choice rules turn out to be particularly useful in the characterization results that follow.
Gradual Pairwise Comparison
The choice procedure of gradual pairwise comparison (GPC) is as follows. The decision-maker, endowed with a strict rational preference P , does not consider all the binary comparisons in P simultaneously. Instead, she has an ordered partition
Given a choice set, the agent considers all the relevant pairwise comparisons in P 1 simultaneously, eliminating all alternatives found inferior. With the alternatives that survive she then considers the relevant comparisons (given the set of surviving alternatives) in P 2 and so on. For a given ordered partition P of P and a choice set A ∈ X , define the following sets recursively,
M P i (A) contains all alternatives that survive after the decision maker has considered the ith cell of her ordered partition.
For any choice set A, letĨ P (A) be the cell of the partition that finally reduces the surviving options to a singleton. Formally,Ĩ P (A) = i ≤ I such that |M P i (A)| = 1 and either |M P i−1 (A)| > 1 or i = 1 . 5Ĩ P is well defined since P is a partition of a strict rational preference P . 6 If the decision-maker could complete all comparisons, her choice would coincide with deterministic rational choice. Her (possible) inability to do so is captured by a function π : (P ∪ {P 0 }) × X → [0, 1], such that P i ∈P π(P i , A) + π(P 0 , A) = 1 and π(PĨP (A) , A) > 0 for all A ∈ X , labeled stopping function. 7 For any choice set A, π(P i , A) is the probability that the decision maker stops at cell P i and is unable to complete the comparisons contained in subsequent cells. π(P 0 , A) is the probability with which she is unable to complete any relevant comparison at all. While the premise of this study is that a decision-maker may be unable to make all relevant comparisons, assuming π(PĨP (A) , A) > 0 for all A ∈ X requires that her ability to do so cannot be ruled out entirely either. It says that the decision-maker is able to make all relevant comparisons with positive probability. In deterministic rational choice this probability would have to be 1.
Conditional on stopping after considering cell P i , the procedure entails the decisionmaker choosing with equal odds from among the alternatives that remain, M P i (A). 5 |B| denotes the number of elements in the set B. 6 For any i < I, by definition, |M P i (A)| ≥ |M P i+1 (A)|. P being a partition of a strict rational preference P implies that M P I (A) is a singleton (containing the most preferred alternative in A). 7 The obvious dependence of the stopping function on the partition P is suppressed for notational convenience.
Definition 2.
A gradual pairwise comparison rule (GPCR) is a stochastic choice rule p P,π with an ordered partition P of a strict rational preference P and a stopping function π such that for all A ∈ X ,
A simple pairwise comparison rule(SPCR) is a GPCR, p P,π , for which each cell of the ordered partition P is a singleton. Formally, |P i | = 1 for all P i ∈ P. A stochastic choice rule p, is rationalizable by gradual pairwise comparison, if there exists an ordered partition P of a preference P ∈ P and a stopping function π such that p = p P,π .
To see how the procedure works consider the following example. Read the table above as lottery a yields $7100 with probability 3/4 and $1005 with probability 1/4, and so on. The agent's underlying preference ranks a over b over c. Nevertheless, she is able to make the comparison between a and b the earliest, followed by the one between a and c and then b and c.
Formally, X = {a, b, c}. The decision-maker's preference is a b c. In other
Her stopping function is the following.
The resulting choice probabilities through gradual pairwise comparison are the following. Relying on this observation, the subsequent analysis continues to use the more general stopping functions, which are easier to describe in proofs. Exact stopping functions are used in all examples. Finally, choosing between these two classes of stopping functions has no impact on any of the results that follow.
Characterization
Choice Probabilities and Choice Rank
The ordinal content of choice probabilities is labeled choice rank. This is the ranking of alternatives in a choice set generated by the choice probabilities, with a higher choice probability corresponding to a higher rank. Since the mapping from choice probabilities to choice rank is many-to-one, knowledge of choice rank alone cannot pin down the exact value of choice probabilities.
The two key components of a GPC procedure, the ordered partition P and the stopping function π, play very different roles in determining choice rank and choice probabilities. Choice rank is essentially determined by P, the sequence in which the constituent pairwise comparisons of the rational preference are considered (and therefore the underlying preference too). Theorem 1. Fix an ordered partition P of some P ∈ P. Let π and π be stopping functions on P. Then for any A ∈ X and a, b ∈ X, p P,π (a, A) > p P,π (b, A) ⇒ p P,π (a, A) ≥ p P,π (b, A).
Proof. It follows from the definition of these sets in (1) that for any P, M P j (A) ⊇ M P k (A) for all j, k ≤ I with j < k. Also for any a, b ∈ A, one of the sets {i|a ∈ M P i (A)} and {i|b ∈ M P i (A)} must be a subset of the other. Therefore
In other words, changing the stopping function cannot reverse strict choice ranks.
Further, any stochastic choice rule that always has a unique most probable alternative and is consistent with the choice ranks of some GPCR can be rationalized by choosing an appropriate stopping function while leaving the ordered partition of the original GPCR unchanged.
Theorem 2. Fix an ordered partition P of some P ∈ P and a stopping function π.
Let p be a stochastic choice rule that satisfies unique best and for all A ∈ X and
Then there exists π such that p = p P,π .
Taken together, the two theorems above show that the key step to rationalizing a stochastic choice rule by gradual pairwise comparison is to obtain an ordered partition of the underlying preference that generates the required choice ranks. It is then guaranteed that there exists an appropriate stopping function for the remaining task of matching the exact choice probabilities.
General Characterization
Deterministic rational choice is a particular case of the GPC procedure. Indeed, for any preference P ∈ P, and any ordered partition P of it, setting π(PĨP (A) , A) = 1 ensures that p P,π (a, A) = 1 if a is the most preferred element in A according to P and p P,π (a, A) = 0 otherwise. This is unsurprising, since setting π(PĨP (A) , A) = 1 implies that the agent is able to make all relevant comparisons before making her decision.
More interestingly, the GPC procedure can rationalize choice reversals. For instance, in example 1, adding the alternative a to the choice set {b, c}, increases the probability of c being selected from 1/3 to 2/5 while reducing that of b from 2/3 to 0.
Commonly used stochastic choice rules such as the Luce rule cannot allow such choice reversals. In fact, the increased probability of c violates regularity, a property that requires p(a, A) ≥ p(a, B) for all a ∈ A ⊆ B. This puts the GPC choice procedure outside the scope of Random Utility Models, which necessarily satisfy regularity.
It is natural, then, to wonder whether the GPC procedure has any empirical content. Indeed, it does and it can be characterized. Start by defining an appropriate notion of revealed preference.
Definition 3. Given a stochastic choice rule p and a, b ∈ X, a is stochastically
Note that it is not enough for a to simply have a higher choice probability than b to be revealed preferred to it; a must be the most probable alternative in the presence of b. This leads to the most immediate testable implication of the GPC procedure, labeled stochastic weak axiom of revealed preference or sWARP.
then b is not stochastically revealed preferred to a.
In words, alternatives that were not the most probable in a given set, cannot become the most probable in the presence of the original most probable alternative.
Given the assumption of strict preferences, an immediate implication of sWARP is that for any choice set there is a unique alternative with the highest choice probability.
sWARP relates entirely to how the most probable alternative varies across choice sets. It imposes no restriction on the choice probabilities or even the choice rank of alternatives that are not the most probable. The testable implications of GPC on these are more subtle.
Let A T (p) be the set of all p-truncations of A ∈ X . In words, any set of the m highest (choice) ranked alternatives in the set A under p is a p-truncation of A. Note that A ∈ A T (p). Then any stochastic choice rule without ties that is rationalizable by GPC must satisfy the following property, labeled Invariance to Truncation by Rank (ITR).
ITR simply requires that if the same set of alternatives D, makes up the top n choice ranks in two different sets then the choice rank of any alternative in D must be the same in the two sets. Compare this to the far more restrictive Luce's IIA, which requires not only that the choice rank ordering of any pair of alternatives is the same across any two sets where they both belong but that the ratio of their choice probabilities is menu-independent too.
Consider the universe of choice procedures in which pairwise comparisons are used sequentially to eliminate alternatives, with an earlier elimination corresponding to a worse choice rank. ITR requires that along such a procedure an eliminated alternative should have no bearing on the choice ranks of the alternatives that remain. The GPC procedure satisfies this by virtue of two of its features. First, once an alternative is eliminated, any comparison between the latter and the remaining alternatives is rendered irrelevant. Second, the order of relevant comparisons is menu-independent.
The final axiom is labeled s(tochastic)-reducibility. LetX denote the subset of X containing all subsets of X with at least two elements.
Axiom 4 (s-Reducibility). For every nonempty collection of sets B ⊆X , there
s-reducibility says that for any collection of choice sets, there must exist a pair of alternatives a and b, such that b is always (choice) ranked last in a set in this collection whenever a is also present. Compare this to Luce's IIA, under which any collection of sets must have an alternative that is ranked last whenever available in a set in this collection. s-reducibility is a lot weaker, in that b need not be the lowest ranked whenever available in a set in the collection, but only so in the presence of a.
Consider again the universe of choice procedures using sequential pairwise comparisons to eliminate alternatives. s-reducibility requires that for any collection of choice sets there exists a pairwise comparison that is the first relevant one for the collection. In the GPC procedure this follows from the menu-independence of the order of relevant comparisons.
Not only are sWARP, ITR and s-reducibility necessary, but they are also jointly sufficient for a stochastic choice rule without ties to be rationalizable by GPC. to be the same across all sets that contain them both. The first implication of order independence for a choice rule without ties is exactly sWARP, which is retained. The second implication is the existence in any collection of sets of a worst alternative, which as a result always ranks last whenever available in a set in the collection. This is weakened to s-reducibility. The final implication has to do with alternatives that are not the most or least probable, requiring the choice rank ordering of any two such alternatives to be menu-independent. This is weakened to ITR. in the sequential procedure that is relevant to any set in the collection. 9 This is a critical ingredient in the construction used to prove the sufficiency part of theorem 3.
Revealed Preference and Order of Comparison
Given choice data consistent with a decision-maker using the GPC procedure, it is very easy to infer the unique underlying rational preference relation. Indeed, it is the same as the stochastically revealed prefered relation.
Theorem 4. Given a GPC choice rule p P,π where P is an ordered partition of P ∈ P,
Different pairs of P and π can rationalize the same stochastic choice rule. For instance, deterministic rational choice with preference P can be rationalized by any ordered partition P of P and π such that π(PĨ (A) , A) = 1. So while the choice data always uniquely pins down the underlying preference relation, in this case it offers no clue about the particular order in which the decision-maker considers the pairwise comparisons. Now consider the following choice data. after. For the latter, consider the following P and π which also rationalizes the choice rule.
This leads to an obvious question: is it possible to infer from choice data rationalizable by GPC that some pairwise comparison must be considered before some other?
Indeed, it is. Begin by appropriately defining these pairs of comparisons which must always be ordered in a specific way to rationalize some given choice data.
Definition 5. For a choice rule p, rationalizable by GPC, (a, b) is revealed compared before (x, y) if for all P, π such that p = p P,π , To see this, consider the following example.
The resulting choice probabilities are as follows. 
Similarity Effect
Debreu (1960), through a thought experiment, pointed out that Luce's IIA is unable to accommodate alternatives that are very similar. The principle that Luce's IIA runs counter to in the thought experiment and for which there exists considerable empirical support is called the similarity effect, described in Tversky (1972b) as follows:
"The addition of an alternative to an offered set 'hurts' alternatives that are similar to the added alternative more than those that are dissimilar to it."
The GPC choice procedure accommodates the similarity effect in an obvious way. c itself must happen sufficiently late in the sequence, so that with a high probability the decision maker treats them interchangeably.
Formally, b and c being similar in a GPC choice procedure, (P, π), is modelled as
While (i) and (ii) capture ordinal features of similar alternatives about how they relate to any third alternative, (iii) is about how they relate to each other cardinally.
In particular ν is an upper bound to how far apart their choice probabilities can be;
ν ≥ |p P,π (b, A) − p P,π (c, A)| for any {b, c} ⊆ A ∈ X . The following proposition then describes how the GPC procedure accommodates the similarity effect.
Proposition 1. Suppose b is similar to c and dissimilar to a with {a, b} ⊆ A and
For small enough and ν, (i) if p P,π (a, A) < p P,π (b, A) then
(ii) if p P,π (a, A) > p P,π (b, A) > 0 then
Note that adding c to the choice set A leaves the set and sequence of relevant comparisons essentially unchanged. 11 It is reasonable then to assume that the stop- with higher probability than a in A, then b loses strictly more probability than a upon the addition of c, for sufficiently small change in the stopping rule (inequality 3). If instead, a was chosen with a higher probability than b in A, both positive, then both these alternatives lose essentially the same amount of probability upon the addition of c. Nevertheless, the similarity effect obtains with b losing a larger proportion of its probability compared to a (inequality 4), improving the odds ratio in favour of a.
The rationale behind the result is simple. The only effect of adding c to A, is c joining all survivor sets M P i that contain b (except the one following the comparison (b, c)), leaving all else unchanged. This makes c take away more probability from b than a, either directly as in part (i) where the set of survivor sets containing a is a strict subset of those containing b, or proportionally as in part (ii) where the survivor sets containing a and those containing b, that are affected by c are the same but a is chosen with the higher probability in A. )). The example above shows that even in a single decision problem fatigue may worsen choices. Indeed, even adding alternatives that are relatively easily found to be inferior may nevertheless make it less probable that the decision-maker completes the more difficult comparisons.
Violation of Regularity Through Fatigue
This phenomenon is distinct from the attraction effect. In the latter the increased probability of choosing b upon adding c does not depend on the preference between a and b. By contrast, in the argument above it matters that a is preferred to b. Here the earlier comparison, (b, c), helps the inferior alternative b in the later one (a, b).
Discussion
Sequence of Pairwise Comparisons
An essential ingredient of the GPC procedure is that choice involves a sequence of pairwise comparisons. Ravid The simple premise behind choosing an alternative in the GPC procedure is that it is not found inferior in any relevant pairwise comparison. Based on this alone the agent has no reason to further discriminate among surviving alternatives. This is the logic behind the agent randomizing uniformly across these alternatives. There exist more involved variants of the procedure where the agent uses additional information to randomize non-uniformly across surviving alternatives. 12 It is beyond the scope of this study to consider and compare such variants. Hopefully, subsequent theoretical and empirical work such as Reutskaja et al. (2011) will identify the interesting variants.
Menu (In)Dependence
The menu independence of the order of relevant comparisons follows from the assumption that easier comparisons precede more difficult ones. Consider example 1 again.
The agent finds the comparison (a, b) easier to make than (a, c). Since this relative ease depends directly on a, b and c, adding another lottery to the menu should have no effect on it. Note, however, that adding a new lottery could make one or both of these comparisons irrelevant. 13 But if (a, b) and (a, c) continue to be relevant upon adding another lottery, then the comparison (a, b) must continue to precede (b, c).
While the menu dependent choice described in Section 4 is not an example of framing effects, the GPC procedure can accommodate the latter in a natural way.
Framing an alternative differently while leaving its payoff relevant features the same does not change the preference ordering but typically changes the order of relevant pairwise comparisons, thereby affecting choice.
The key driver of context dependent choice in the GPC procedure is the menudependent nature of the set of relevant pairwise comparisons. This interacts with the menu-independent order of relevant comparisons, to generate a highly menu-dependent sequence of actual comparisons the decision-maker makes.
Random Attention Models
Recent work has focused on a different source of bounded rationality. 14 
Example 3. (Violation of RAM Acyclicity)
The ordered partition of the underlying preference a b c d is
The stopping function is the following. 
Luce's Model and Related Work
In Luce's model, if the underlying preference is a strict order, as in this study, then the alternatives can be assigned values, u(x) ∈ R ++ , ∀x ∈ X , such that u(x) = u(y) if x = y and p(x, A) = u(x)/( y∈A u(y)). All such choice rules are rationalizable by GPC.
Consider the following construction which rationalizes any choice rule where given the function u(·) above, p(x, A) > p(y, A) if and only if u(x) > u(y). 16 Luce's model is a particular case of this more general class of choice rules. Order the n alternatives
The ordered partition is the following:
In words, the first element of the ordered partition contains all pairwise comparisons in which the alternative with the lowest value under u is the inferior alternative. The second element contains all pairwise comparisons in which the alternative with the second lowest value under u is the inferior alternative, and so on. Let π be such that π(P i , ·) > 0 for all i ≤ n. It then follows that
Matching the exact choice probabilities then follows from theorem 2. Also by theorem 2, the k(A) lowest ranked alternatives in choice set A can be assigned 0 probability.
This formulation, in a natural way, allows for zero probabilities in choice, while staying consistent with the order independence axiom. 17 Finally, to match the choice probabilities to the Luce rule exactly, the following stopping rule π (along with the ordered partition above) is sufficient. Fix A ∈ X . Let
x i and x k be two alternatives in A with adjacent choice ranks and x k the worse of the two, where i and k correspond to the order described in the previous paragraph. Set
and π(P n−q+1 , A) = |A|u(x q )/( x j ∈A u(x j )) where x q is the worst choice ranked option in A.
A Appendix Lemma 1. For any GPCR, p P,π , there exists an SPCR, p P ,π , such that p P,π = p P ,π .
Proof. Consider a GPCR, p Pn,πn and let P k be the first cell in P n that is not a singleton.
Since P is a strict rational preference there must exist some (x, y) ∈ P k such that (y, c) ∈ P k for any c ∈ X. Let (a, b) ∈ P k satisfy this condition. Define a new ordered partition P n+1 = {P j } and stopping function π n+1 in the following way: P i = P i for all i < k, P k = (a, b), P k+1 = P k \ {(a, b)}, P i+1 = P i for all i > k, π n+1 (P i , ·) = π n (P i , ·) for all i < k, π n+1 (P k , ·) = 0 and π n+1 (P i+1 , ·) = π n (P i , ·) for all i ≥ k. It is easy to confirm that p Pn,πn = p P n+1 ,π n+1 . So setting P 1 = P and π 1 = π, generates a finite sequence {p Pn,πn } m n=1 using the construction above, such that p Pm,πm is an SPCR. Setting P m = P and π m = π concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. For any GPCR, p P,π , there exists a GPCR without ties, p P ,π , such that for all A ∈ X and a, b ∈ X, p P ,π (a, A) > p P ,π (b, A) ⇒ p P,π (a, A) ≥ p P,π (b, A).
Proof. Fix a GPCR p P,π . Then by lemma 1 there exists an SPCR, say p P,π , such that p P,π = p P,π . Set P = P. Pick any stopping function π on P such that π (P i , ·) > 0 for all P i ∈ P . Then p P ,π is a GPCR without ties. Also, p P ,π (a, A) > p P ,π (b, A) ⇒ p P,π (a, A) ≥ p P,π (a, A) ⇔ p P,π (a, A) ≥ p P,π (b, A).
The first implication is because P = P and Theorem 1.
Proof of Observation 1. It is sufficient to show that given a GPCR p P,π , it follows that p P,π = p P,π , where π is an exact stopping function. Let Z(A) = {i ≤ I|M P i (A) = M P i−1 (A)} ∪ {0}. For any j ∈ Z(A), let k(j) be the smallest number in the set Z(A) that is larger than j. If j is the highest number in Z(A) then let k(j) = I + 1. Set
Otherwise set π (P j , A) = 0. π is therefore an exact stopping function. Now fix some A ∈ X and a ∈ A. Observe that
Proof of Theorem 2. Given P and some A ∈ X , define the sequence of sets, In what follows, π is selected so that π (P i , A) ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ I. Let j be the smallest number i for which E i (A) is nonempty. Set π such that j−1 i=0 π (P i , A) = |A|p(α j , A). Subsequently, for any j and k with j < k such that E j (A) and E k (A) are non-empty and E q (A) = ∅ for all j < q < k, set π such that
Finally if j is the largest number i for which E i (A) is non-empty then set π (P j , A) = p(α j , A) − p(α h , A), where h is the second largest number i for which E i (A) is nonempty.
π , so defined, is a stopping function. Indeed, the selections ensure that π (P i , A) ≥ 
Since p satisfies unique best, |A|− j |E j (A)| = 1. This is what ensures that the third equality above holds. It is now straightforward to verify that p P,π (a, A) = p(α j , A)
where a ∈ E j (A). Proof of Theorem 3. Necessity: It is sufficient to show that if p P,π is an SCR without ties then it satisfies sWARP, s-reducibility and ITR. It turns out that any p P,π (not just those without ties) satisfies sWARP. sWARP: Suppose under the SCR p P,π , a is stochastically revealed preferred to b. 
So for some
Also let π be a stopping function on P such that π(P i , ·) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I. It will now be shown that P so defined is a partition of a strict rational preference. By construction, if (a, b) ∈ P i then {a, b} ⊆ A for any A ∈ C j with j > i. Therefore (b, a) ∈ P j for j > i. This proves asymmetry. Next, by s-reducibility, as long as C i is nonempty, C i+1 ⊂ C i . So for a given pair a, b, either {a, b} ∈ C j for some j such that A ∈ C j for any A ⊃ {a, b} or (a, b) ∈ P i or (b, a) ∈ P i for some i < j. In the first case it must be that either (a, b) ∈ P i or (b, a) ∈ P i for some j ≤ i ≤ I.
This proves completeness. Finally, to prove transitivity, note that by construction,
Suppose by contradiction there exists a sequence {x i , y i } n i=1 such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (x i , y i ) ∈ P j(i) , y i = x i+1 , ∀i < n and x 1 = y n . Since p satisfies sWARP there must be a unique most probable alternative under p in the set A = ∪ n i=1 {x i , y i }, say a. But then there must exist some 1 ≤ i ≤ n for which a = y i . This contradicts the assumption that p satisfies sWARP. Therefore p P,π is a well defined SPCR. Further by construction p P,π is an SCR without ties. To see why, note first that since p P,π is an SPCR, for any A ∈X and a, b ∈ A, one of the two sets {i|a ∈ M P i (A)} and {i|b ∈ M P i (A)}, must be a strict subset of the other. Now since π(P i , ·) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I it must be that either p P,π (a, A) > p P,π (b, A) or p P,π (a, A) < p P,π (b, A).
To complete the proof it is sufficient to show that for all A ∈ X and a, b ∈ X, p P,π (a, A) > p P,π (b, A) ⇒ p(a, A) > p(b, A). Theorem 2 then guarantees the existence of a π such that p P,π = p, since sW ARP implies unique best.
Suppose by contradiction there exists an A ∈X such that the condition above does not hold. Consider the choice ranks defined by p P,π and p on the alternatives in A. In particular, start with the lowest ranked alternative (smallest choice probability) according to each and if they are the same then move one rank up. If there exists
x, y ∈ A such that p P,π (x, A) > p P,π (y, A) but p(y, A) > p(x, A), then eventually this process must end with the m'th ranked alternative according to p P,π being different from that according to p, with m > 1, while all lower ranked alternatives are identical.
Let B be the set of all alternatives in A ranked m or better by p P,π . By construction B
is also the set of alternatives in A ranked m or better by p. So B is both a p-truncation and a p P,π -truncation of A.
Suppose a is the m'th ranked alternative in A (and therefore also B) under Proof of Theorem 6. Necessity: It is sufficient to show that for any GPCR p P,π , unique best is satisfied and that there exists a GPCR without ties p P ,π such that for all A ∈ X and a, b ∈ X, p P ,π (a, A) > p P ,π (b, A) ⇒ p P,π (a, A) ≥ p P,π (b, A). The latter follows directly from lemma 2. As for the former, it has already been shown in the proof of theorem 3 that a GP CR necessarily satisfies sWARP. It is easy to see that sWARP implies unique best.
Sufficiency: Suppose p satisfies unique best and there exists an SCR without ties p that satisfies sWARP, ITR and s-reducibility such that for all A ∈ X and a, b ∈ X
Since p is an SCR without ties and satisfies sWARP, ITR and s-reducibility, by theorem 3 there exists a GPCR p P,π such that p P,π = p . Moreover, since the (possible) ties in p are consistent with p = p P,π as in 6, by theorem 2, there exists π such that p = p P,π .
Proof of Theorem 4. " ⇒ " : If (a, b) ∈ P then p P,π (a, {a, b}) > p P,π (b, {a, b}) since by assumption π(PĨP (A) , A) > 0 for all A ∈ X .
" ⇐ " : The fact that a is stochastically revealed preferred to b implies that there exists some A ∈ X with b ∈ A such that M P I P (A) (A) = {a}. The result then follows directly from lemma 4. Lemma 5. Suppose p P,π is an SPCR with P j = (a, b), P j+1 = (x, y) and π(P i , ·) > 0
where P i = P i for all i < j and i > j + 1, P j = (x, y) and P j+1 = (a, b) and π (P i , ·) > 0 for all P i ∈ P . π (w, B) . The second line in that expression is strictly positive since p P,π (b, A) > p P,π (a, A). The third line in that expression can be no smaller than − − ν. Therefore for sufficiently small and ν we get p P,π (b, A) − p P,π (b, A ∪ {c}) > p P,π (a, A) − p P,π (a, A ∪ {c}). This is strictly greater than p(b,A) |A| − , which is positive for small enough .
Independence of Axioms
To see the independence of the three axioms used to characterize the GPC procedure, consider the following examples. For the latter, notice that d is ranked last in the presence of c inX . For any collection without a set containing {c, d}, but with one containing {a, d}, d is ranked last in the presence of a. In any other collection with at least one set with more than 2 elements, b is ranked last in the presence of a. Any collection of sets that contain no more than two alternatives satisfies the requirement of s-reducibility trivially. It is easy to fill in the remaining data points to satisfy both sWARP and ITR, but no such choice rule can satisfy s-reducibility. The choice ranks in the set {a, b, c, d} require that d is ranked last in the presence of some alternative y in the collection of the three sets mentioned in the example, with y ∈ {a, b, c}. It cannot be a or c since d is not ranked last in {a, c, d} and not b since d is not ranked last in {b, c, d}.
